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1Cyber Inference System for Substation Anomalies
Against Alter-and-Hide Attacks
Chong Wang, Student Member, IEEE, Chee-Wooi Ten, Senior Member, IEEE,
Yunhe Hou, Senior Member, IEEE, and Andrew Ginter, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Alarms reported to energy control centers are an
indication of abnormal events caused by either weather interrup-
tions, system errors, or possibly intentional anomalies. Although
these initiating events are random, e.g., faults on transmission
lines struck by lightning, the existence of electronically altered
measurements may implicate the process to identify root causes
of abnormal events. This paper is concerned with alter-and-
hide (AaH) attacks by tampering the actual measurements to
normal states with the background of disruptive switching actions
that hide the true values of local events from operators at the
control center. A cyber inference system (CyIS) framework is
proposed to synthesize all sequential, missing, or altered alarms
of related substations against AaH attacks. The stochastic nature
of such attack events is modeled with probabilities as an integer
programming problem with multiple scenarios. The proposed
method is utilized to verify alarm scenarios for a conclusion of
the potential AaH attacks on the substations.
Index Terms—Alter and hide (AaH), cyber inference system,
future control center, situation awareness, tampered alarm events.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
INCE the early 1970s, the centralized grid control systems
have been computerized with monolithic energy man-
agement systems (EMS) to help operators monitor system
conditions. Alarms are generated, processed, and presented to
the operators for operational readiness under abnormal cir-
cumstances [1], [2]. Such disturbance events can be either in-
tentional or unintentional and may require human intervention
with a control response to mitigate the risks of system collapse.
Due to the sophisticated topologies of busbar arrangement
in substations, a single disturbance can result in a large
number of alarm events [3], [4]. For two or more independent
disturbances, they may result in overlapped alarms, and some
might be missed or delayed. These are circumstances that most
common alarm analyzers deal with. There has been extensive
research that focuses on alarm processing algorithms based
on imperfect reported alarms [4]–[7]. Such expert systems
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were implemented as an online application of fault diagnosis
to handle corrupted alarm scenarios [8]–[10]. In addition,
there are other methods have been implemented, such as,
Petri nets [11]–[13], artificial neural networks [14]–[16] and
rough sets [17]. The evolutionary alarm processors in software
engineering are used to synthesize the voluminous alerts
from substations. A simplified version of the alarm-related
information is to help system operators systematically pinpoint
the cause of events and possible short circuit locations from
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in
the control center.
IP-based instrumentation is now the main stream of com-
munication technology deployment. Today’s power automation
using information communication technologies has become
increasingly distributed and networked, which has raised con-
cerns about cyber threats. With Internet protocol (IP)-based
systems for wide-area communication, SCADA systems can
be vulnerable to a cyberattack [18]. Misconceptions have been
addressed with respect to skills and malicious behaviors that
would progress slower than the development of infrastructures
and technologies [19]. While communications have evolved,
the malicious intent of attackers remains. This is one of
the critically important priorities for cyber-physical interde-
pendent research [20]. The process of SCADA cyberattacks
can be generalized, and a conceptual framework has been
introduced [21]. Analyzing incomplete spatiotemporal events
with their dependencies can be challenging. More precisely,
capturing the anomalies within substation-level networks can
be strengthened with additional anomaly detectors in dis-
tributed configuration [22], [23]. However, these would cost
asset owners to invest additional cybersecurity protection in
substations.
Despite all preliminary efforts made to implement protection
technologies in substation networks, there remains serious
concerns regarding the impacts of attacks using domain-
specific knowledge of individuals. Such attacks could aggre-
gate operating conditions as well as mislead operators to make
erroneous decisions. Cyber-situation awareness in the control
room can be further improved by utilizing already existing
metering or alarm information with enhanced inference algo-
rithms. The major contribution of this work is to employ a
mathematical model using integer programming to distinguish
between potentially malicious incidents of AaH attacks and
common disturbances. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II presents the AaH attack model with the
proposed cyber inference system (CyIS). In Section III, logical
relations among alarms and event hypotheses are introduced,
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2and the model is formulated without considering cyberattacks
and stochastic issues of alarms. Section IV relates stochastic
nature of cyberattacks to the proposed model. Section V
verifies simulation results. Section VI concludes with future
work.
II. AAH ATTACK MODELING
A substation communication network is a complex hy-
brid system. The cyber-physical security problem is often
related to the relationship between physical infrastructure and
potential cyber manipulation, resulting directly or indirectly
in operational impacts. This may cause overloading damage
and may affect any other states of equipment health with
both short-term or long-term implications. Stuxnet has proven
the feasibility of intelligent attacks in the computing world
[24], [25]. Local IP-based intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)
can be infected and a worm could be programmed with
domain-specific knowledge that embeds codes with malicious
commands in IEDs while reporting normal states of operations
to control centers [26]. This section consists of three parts:
(A) AaH Attack, (B) Attack execution plan, and (C) Anomaly
inference of the AaH Attacks.
A. AaH Attacks
Alter-and-hide (AaH) attacks refer to an alteration of true
values of a partial system, such as, one substation network or
more, with an intent to avoid detection by defenders. Malicious
activities, such as plotting for a cyberattack in the background
covertly, are assumed in a programmed software agent. A
successful exploration of critical assets may enable attackers to
manipulate metering information intelligently that can mislead
operators to action or inaction in a control room. Such as attack
can cause serious consequences in system operation. One
example of such characteristics is the behavior of Stuxnet. The
attack agent generally has three malicious parts: (1) a worm
executes all routines, (2) an intelligent module propagates the
worm to additional machines, and (3) rootkit components hide
malicious files and processes to prevent detection [27].
This work is motivated by the credibility of potential in-
telligent cyberthreats. Unlike the existing conventional attacks
focusing on cyber networks, the AaH is a behavioral attack
agent that can also be programmed with the intelligence to dis-
ruptive switching. Successful implementation by blocking the
locally generated alarms at substation level on circuit breakers
would prevent alerting operators in the control room. By
harnessing system topology and metering integrity, availability
as well as topology information, substation anomalies of a
possible AaH attack can be inferred. The following describes
the assumptions:
1) There may be one or more attackers who can coordinate
their attacks from different compromised substations.
However, the attackers may not know the relation be-
tween one and the other(s), e.g., the connectivity of
affected substations if they are closely related in the
region.
2) The attackers may not know complete information about
a power grid’s connectivity. The successful intrusions
to multiple substation networks would be restricted to
the information the attackers can observe over a short
period of time. For example, if the attackers com-
promise two substations, it is likely that they do not
know the relationship between the two compromised
substations. Unless, there is information to relate the
addresses connecting the local SCADA network to the
other compromised network(s).
3) The attackers know the connections between substa-
tion(s) and control center, and the mapping addresses of
a measurement list. In this case, the attackers would need
to understand the DNP communication protocol as well
as knowing how to create fake information for sending
to the control center. This process happens concurrently
to plan for attacks using local substation SCADA.
Hypothetically, an attack plan can be executed in an IP-based
substation network.
B. Attack Execution Plan
Consider an example of a Distributed Network Protocol
version 3.0 (DNP3) replay attack. The following describes
generally how an AaH attack can be executed:
1) A controller server is deployed in a substation to com-
municate across a TCP/IP wide area network (WAN)
with a central SCADA server. This is the only controller
in a substation that serves as a data concentrator for
DNP3 protocol data gathered from all substation de-
vices, and reports this data to the central SCADA server
using a single DNP3 address and session.
2) The substation controller is typically set up in a way
where it is remotely accessible via a user interface, such
as Telnet, secure shell (SSH), or remote desktop, for the
purposes of system administration and trouble-shooting.
To initialize an attack in a substation, attackers require
gaining access to this administrative user interface. Such
access can be gained, for example, remotely via a
stolen password, a hijacked remote access session, or
by physically breaking in the substation to access the
substation automation controller.
3) Once in control of an administrative session, the attacker
transfers, installs, and runs a packet sniffing tool. The
tool is written by someone who understands DNP3
packet formats and records the register numbers and
values the controller reports to the central SCADA
system. After running this tool for a period of time, the
attacker stops and disables the legitimate DNP3 software
server. The attacker then starts a malicious DNP3 em-
ulator. The emulator impersonates the legitimate DNP3
software, responding to DNP3 queries from the central
SCADA server the same way as the legitimate controller
responded. But the malicious emulator reports only the
recorded register values with faked time stamps.
At this point, the attackers can change any settings on
substation equipment without these changes being reported
to control center systems by equipment in the compromised
substation. Alternatively, if the attackers are physically present,
they can execute their attack plan directly to the equipment
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Fig. 1. AaH attacks on substation networks with CyIS verification on open circuit breakers and generated alarms blocked by attackers.
panel, while using the emulator to report normal conditions
on substation status. Security measures such as encryption,
anti-virus, whitelisting and many others increase the difficulty
of this attack but are unable to prevent such an attack entirely.
Fundamentally, this is a “software attack on a software sys-
tem.” In practice, all software has defects, and some defects are
security vulnerabilities that can be compromised. This includes
security software. This relay attack example is only one of
many examples of possible attacks, and comparable attacks
are possible for other standardized communication protocols.
C. Anomaly Inference of the AaH Attacks
Fig. 1 (a) shows the existing architecture of the modules for
alarm and topology processors, state estimator, and power
flow module. The topology processor uses the statuses of
circuit breakers (CB) to get the system topology. Based on
the system topology and analog measurements, e.g., active and
reactive power, a state estimation is first performed, following
by power flow to determine the best snapshot of a system state.
False data injection, e.g., changing measurements of active
power, by intruders can be detected in the process of state
estimation [28], [29] in the existing architecture. However,
the existing architecture cannot deal with AaH attacks, which
open substation circuit breakers and falsify substation data
reports. For example, the circuit breaker C2, in Fig. 1 (b), is
opened by the attackers, and the attackers change the values
reported to an energy management system (EMS), which
identifies the system topology as TO2. With this topology,
the state estimation and the power flow calculation would be
inaccurate. Therefore, before performing the state estimation,
the proposed cyber inference system (CyIS) will determine
anomalies before passing the information to state estimator
and power flow module, as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The CyIS
mainly gathers all datasets from system topology, received CB
alarms and PR alarms to infer if a substation might be under
an AaH attack, and then update the system topology.
III. CYBER INFERENCE SYSTEM
The cyber inference system (CyIS) is a spatiotemporal
anomaly agent that synthesizes all topologies and alarm infor-
mation to detect possible AaH attacks. Fig. 2 details the archi-
tecture of CyIS and how it gathers and correlates information
inconsistencies. Typically, SCADA systems present all alarms
to system operators following a disturbance event. These
alarms include analog measurements, such as, current, voltage,
active and reactive power, and digital measurements, e.g.,
protective relay (PR) operation and circuit breaker (CB) trip-
ping. We generalize the digital (binary) measurement alarms
associated with protective relays and circuit breakers, i.e., PR
and CB alarms, in the CyIS module. These are classified in
accordance to the IEC61850 standard. Based on the system
topology, logical rules between PR operation and CB tripping
are modeled in an engineering workstation before transitioning
to online applications. The missed/delayed/tampered alarms
are attributed with probabilities in relations among all events,
e.g., disturbances, PR operation and CB tripping. These
probabilities and the basic rules are considered as an index of
evaluation with integer constraints representing logical rela-
tions between possible events with reported alarms. Typically,
the size can be practically large and scenario reduction is
employed to handle a larger set of increasing alarms with event
hypotheses. The integer programming is applied to determine
irregularities.
A. Anomaly Modeling
The irregularity of incoming alarms is determined based
on combinations of telemetered measurements from substation
automation networks. This section establishes a generalized
alarms with event hypotheses and expected arrival of alarms
at the control center. The following PR and CB definitions
are given to establish notational consistency for the proposed
model:
1) Reported Alarms: Following an event of disturbance,
whether it is a fault or potential cyberattacks, alarms are
generated and transmitted to control centers. These reported
alarms can be delayed, missed, or electronically tampered.
We consider two types of alarms for the development of the
proposed inference system.
• PR alarms: Alarms are related to PR operation.
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Fig. 2. Components of Proposed Cyber Inference System (CyIS) and
Relations with Existing Power Control Center Applications.
• CB alarms: Tripping alarms CB by the PR operation.
The RAi represents a single received alarm and Ω
(RA) denotes
a set of reported alarms, including both PR alarms and CB
alarms at the control center end.
2) Event Hypotheses EH: These hypotheses represent hy-
pothesized events based on the received alarms. Possibilities
of hypothesized events are inferred based on the reported
alarms in the control center. The Ω
(EH)
RAi
denotes a set of
event hypotheses corresponding to the alarm RAi. In real
systems, the relationship between alarms and event hypotheses
are determined by the topology of the system.
3) Expected Reported Alarms: The hypothesis, following
a disturbance event EHk, is assumed that would generate a
series of alarms that are reported to a control center, such as
the PR and CB alarms that are expected. However, a minority
of expected alarms may “slip through the cracks” due to
unknown reasons, resulting those alarms to be missed, delayed,
or tampered with by deceptive users. We denote Ω
(ERA)
EHk
as
a set of all expected reported alarms, i.e., expected PR and
CB alarms that corresponds to event hypotheses EHk.
B. Protective Relay Schemes and Circuit Breaker Tripping
Relational schemes of protective relays can be proprietary.
In this model, we generalize three main protective schemes
that are associated with the tripping of circuit breakers:
• Main Protective Relays (MPRs): This scheme is set up
to be responsible for detecting and isolating failures on
the corresponding devices. During fault occurrence, the
schemes MPRs are supposed to act quickly, and if this
scheme performs correctly, a tripping command will be
sent to the corresponding circuit breakers.
• Backup Protective Relays (BPRs): If the MPRs cannot
act promptly, BPR installed on devices are expected to
act. Similarly, a tripping command will be sent to the
circuit breakers that are associated with this scheme.
• Breaker Failure Protections (BFPs): This scheme deter-
mines if the designed breakers are out of service. If not,
the scheme will react when there is a malfunction of a
circuit breaker.
• Circuit Breakers (CBs): The circuit breakers associated
with the aforementioned three schemes will trip and iso-
late the transmission circuits electrically upon receiving
the trip commands from the protective relays.
These are the alarms from the schemes of MPRs, BPRs,
BFPs and CB tripping considered in the modeling for the
CyIS module as the input of PR and CB.
C. Logical Relations of PR Operation and CB Tripping
The logical relations of PR operation and CB tripping are
important to determine the anomaly. This section first ana-
lyzes scenarios without cyberattacks under an uncertainty of
received alarms in the control center. This is to distinguish the
baseline of potential abnormal condition. In the next section,
hypothetical cyberattack scenarios are elaborated, a distinct
irregularity would be sufficiently conclusive to be inferred
as anomalous. Below is an example to show the formulation
of modeling under one time window with reported alarms at
the control center. The substation topology considered in this
example is shown in Fig. 3.
1) The main PR of L1 operates (RA1);
2) The backup PR of L1 operates (RA2);
3) C5 trips (RA3);
4) C4 trips (RA4).
Based on reported alarms that are successfully received
at the control center, the relations among event hypotheses
and expected alarms is represented in Fig. 4. The relational
diagram denotes that different events can result in different
expected reported alarms. For example, under ideal condition
when an event EH1 occurs, the expected alarms transmitted
to control center should be RA1 and RA8.
In the relational diagram shown in Fig. 4, RA5 denotes
that the backup PR of the device for T1 to operate, RA6
represents that the main PR of the backup device for T1 to
operate, RA7 denotes for the main PR of L1 if it fails to
react, and RA8 represents that C1 to trip. These four alarms
are possibly generated that may not be reported to control
center. The detailed event of hypotheses are shown in Table I.
The integer constraints without AaH consideration are for-
mulated that represent the relations between possible events
and alarms. An evaluation index represents the matching
degree between received reported alarms as well as expected
reported alarms inferred by event hypotheses. Based on the
relations in Fig. 4, a set of Ω(RA), Ω
(EH)
RAi
, and Ω
(ERA)
EHk
,
defined previously, is defined as follows:
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Fig. 3. Functional Diagram of a Substation with Detailed Topology.
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Fig. 4. Logical Relations between Event Hypotheses and Alarms.
TABLE I
EVENT HYPOTHESES
EH No. Content
EH1 A fault on L1; Main PR of L1 act; C1 trips.
EH2 A fault on L1; Main PR of L1 acts; C1 fails to trip.
EH3
A fault on L1; Main PR of L1 fails to act;
Backup PR of L1 act, C1 trips.
EH4
A fault on L1; Main PR of L1 fails to act;
Backup PR of L1 act, but C1 fails to trip.
EH5 A fault on B1.
1) Definitions of Variables and Sets: Based on received
reported alarms, the set of all possible events can be obtained,
as shown in (1).
Ω
(EH) =

 ⋃
RAi∈Ω(RA)
Ω
(EH)
RAi

 (1)
where Ω(RA) is a set of received alarms, Ω
(EH)
RAi
is a set of
event hypotheses with respect to the received alarm RAi. A
set of all expected reported alarms, including PR and CB
alarms, is expressed as
Ω
(ERA) =
⋃
EHk∈Ω(EH)
Ω
(ERA)
EHk
(2)
Decision Variables: Each EHk ∈ Ω
(EH) corresponds to
a decision variable XEHk is to determine which event has
happened. It is a binary value can be either 1 or 0. The value
1 denotes the corresponding event that has happened, and the
value 0 represents the event has not happened.
State Variables: As each possible event can cause by
different PR and CB alarms, the matching degree between
received reported alarms and expected alarms caused is an
index to evaluate each event hypothesis. Therefore, each alarm
RAi ∈ Ω
(ERA) corresponds to a state variable XRAi . Its value
can be either 1 or 0. The value 1 denotes this alarm should
be existent, and the value 0 indicates otherwise.
2) Constraints of Alarm Events: Based on power system
protective schemes, one event hypothesis can generate several
PR and CB alarms. Even though parts of alarms might be
not reported to system operators. These missed, delayed, or
tampered alarms are the relations between one event and its
associated alarms are determined as follows:
XEHk ·
∏
RAi∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
XRAi ·
∏
RAi /∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
(1−XRAi)
+ (1−XEHk) = 1, EHk ∈ Ω
(EH)
(3)
The first part of the left side of the equation ensures the
coincidence of each event and its corresponding alarms, and
the second part of the left side of the equation guarantees
that the corresponding alarms may be also generated by other
events. It means that XRAi ∈ Ω
(ERA)
EHk
can be 0 or 1 when
XEHk = 0. Take EH4 as an example. The constraint can be
written as
XEH4 ·XRA2 · · ·XRA7 · (1−XRA1) · (1−XRA8)
+ (1−XEH4) = 1
(4)
3) Constraints of Different Events: Based on a series of
related alarms, event hypotheses are exclusive when they are
assumed as follows. ∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)
XEHk = 1 (5)
Take EH1, EH2, EH3, EH4 and EH5 for example,
XEH1 +XEH2 +XEH3 +XEH4 +XEH5 = 1 (6)
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64) Model Objective: The matching degree serves as the
objective to optimize the problem. The matching degree de-
termines a measure of the degree to which expected reported
alarms caused by an event hypothesis agree with the reported
alarms received at the control center. The objective function
is represented as follows:
max IN = IN1 + IN2 + IN3 + IN4 (7)
The first part IN1 is
IN1 =
∑
RAi∈Ω(RA)
XRAi
N
(8)
where the denominator N is the number of received reported
alarms to system operators. For each event hypothesis, it
results in its own expected reported alarms. Some overlap
with other received alarms. The numerator denotes the number
of overlapping alarms. For received reported alarms in the
example, IN1 of EH1 and EH4 are 1/4 and 3/4 respectively.
The second part IN2 can be represented as:
IN2 = 1−
∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)

XEHk · ∑
RAi∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
(
XRAi −X
(0)
RAi
)
N
(9)
where X
(0)
RAi
is the original value of the alarm RAi. If the
alarm RAi is in the set of received reported alarms, the value
of X
(0)
RAi
is 1; if RAi is in the set of expected reported alarms
but not in the set of received reported alarms, the value of
X
(0)
RAi
is 0. For example, X
(0)
RA1
= 1 and X
(0)
RA8
= 0. For a
certain event hypothesis, some of its expected reported alarms
might not be in received reported alarms. The numerator in
(9) denotes the number of those expected reported alarms that
are not in received reported alarms. For example, IN2 of EH1
and EH4 are 3/4 and 1/4 respectively.
The third part IN3 can be written as:
IN3 = ∑
RAt∈Ω(RA)
(XRAt)
∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)

XEHk · ∑
RAt∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
XRAi


(10)
where the denominator denotes the number of expected re-
ported alarms caused by a certain event hypothesis. Even
though the expression of the denominator is the sum of
expected reported alarms for all EHk ∈ Ω
(EH), the exclu-
sive between different event hypotheses guarantees that the
denominator is just the number of expected reported alarms
caused by one event. For example, IN3 of EH1 and EH4 are
1/2 and 3/6 respectively.
The fourth part IN4 can be expressed as:
IN4 = 1−
∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)
(
XEHk ·
∑
RAi∈Ω(RA)
(
X
(0)
RAi
−XRAi
))
∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)

XEHk · ∑
RAt∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
XRAi


(11)
where the denominator is identical as in (10). Some received
reported alarms though may not in the expected reported
alarms caused by a certain event hypothesis. The numerator
denotes the number of those reported alarms that are not
in the expected reported alarms. For example, the values of
IN4 of EH1 and EH4 are −1/2 and 5/6 respectively. With
constraints, this can be optimized using integer programming.
IV. MODEL CONSIDERING AAH ATTACKS AND THE
UNCERTAINTIES
This section extends the modeling from previous the sec-
tion with a consideration of AaH attack. The influences of
potential AaH attack on tampered alarms are analyzed with
its randomness and possible scenario reduction.
A. Influences of Cyberattacks on the Alarms
Consider a circumstance where attackers have successfully
hacked into a substation network, and have gained admin-
istrative privilege to perform unauthorized operations, such
as, open circuit breakers. If these generated alarms related
with unauthorized operations are send to the control center,
it can be inferred that the system is under a cyberattack.
For a sophisticated attack like AaH, intruders might tamper
with some alarms, e.g., delete some existent alarms and add
some other non-existent alarms, to hide, suppress, or modify
certain measurements. To maximize their attack outcomes,
covertly planning for a cyberattack is necessary in order for
attackers to understand what functions are available on the
local substation SCADA system. This is a critical step that
intruders have the capacity to open all CBs that are inferred
in the logical relations. Because PRs are designed to respond
to faults, it is believed that unauthorized CB tripping will not
cause PR actions. Therefore, there are only CB alarms if
reported alarms are correct when a system is possibly under
attack. For example, under a perfect situation, alarms should
include RA3, RA4 and RA8 if there is an anomaly in the
given case. However, the received alarms are actually RA1,
RA2, RA3 and RA4. In this case, if the system is subject to
cyberattacks, the intruders should delete RA8 and add RA1
and RA2. Considering characteristics of the communication
system, intruders can tamper alarms with certain probabilities.
Fig. 5 shows the relational rules under a cyberattack scenario.
The probability that received reported alarms under an
attack scenario can be represented as
PEHCA =
∏
PAi∈Ω(PA)
P
(D)
PAi
·
∏
CAi∈Ω(CA)
⋂
Ω(ECA)
P
(D)
CAi
(12)
Page 6 of 14IEEE PES Transactions on Power Systems
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
7EH1 EH3EH2
RA1 RA2 RA6 RA5
Possible Hypotheses Alarms (Reported) Alarms (Not Reported)
EH4 EH5
RA7
RA8 RA4 RA3 CB Alarms
PR Alarms
Event 
HypothesesEHCH
Fig. 5. Omission of Basic Relations under Attack.
where P
(D)
PAi
is the probability of adding an extra PAi
alarm, P
(D)
CAi
is the probability of deleting an existent CAi
alarm. Ω(PA) and Ω(CA) are the sets of received reported
PR and CB alarms respectively, and Ω(PA)
⋃
Ω
(CA) =
Ω
(RA). Ω(ECA) are sets of expected reported CB alarms.
Ω(CA)
⋂
Ω
(ECA) is the set of possible unreceived CA alarms.
For example, this set is {CA8} in Fig. 5.
Considering influences of cyberattacks, the constraint (5)
and the matching degree index with cyberattacks (ICA) is
revised as follows:
max ICA = [IN ]CA·
(1 + PEHCA ·XEHCA −XEHCA)
(13)
∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)
⋃
{EHCA}
XEHk = 1 (14)
where XEHCA denotes the decision variable of a cyberattack
incident. The value 1 means there is an attack incident, 0 is
otherwise. [IN ]CA is the matching degree with considering
common event hypotheses and cyberattacks. The calculation
is similar with (8), (9), (10), and (11). The only difference is
EHk ∈ Ω
(EH)
⋃
{EHCA}.
B. Stochastic Issues of Relations among Events and Alarms
In real systems, some alarms might be delayed and missed
in communication. Therefore, system operators may receive
imperfectly reported alarms. Take EH3, RA2, RA7 and RA8
for example. Without considering unstable communications,
the scenario that includes alarms RA2, RA7, and RA8, as
shown in Fig. 6, is reasonable. However, when considering
delayed or missed alarms, the received reported alarms of other
scenarios in Fig. 6 are also reasonable. These are the general
scenarios that exist with certain probabilities and the sum of
probabilities of all scenarios using (15) is 1, shown in Fig. 6.∑
ASj∈Ω
(AS)
EHk
P
ASj
EHk
= 1, EHk ∈ Ω
EH (15)
where Ω
(AS)
EHk
is the set of all reasonable alarm scenarios
corresponding to EHk, and P
(ASj)
EHk
is the probability of the
alarm scenario to EHk.
RA8
EH3
RA2
EH3
RA7
EH3
RA8
EH3
RA2 RA7
EH3
RA2 RA8
EH3
RA8 RA7
EH3
RA2 RA7
EH3
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e)
(f) (g) (h)
Fig. 6. Multiple Scenarios for One Event Hypothesis.
Fig. 4 shows the scenario of reasonable alarm rules without
delayed and missed alarms. If considering delayed and missed
alarms, there are multiple scenarios of reasonable alarm rules.
The number of scenarios is the number of combinations of
possible alarm scenarios of each event hypothesis. The set of
possible alarm scenarios Ω
(AS)
EH can be represented as follows.
Ω
(AS)
EH =
Ω
(AS)
EH1
×Ω
(AS)
EH2
× · · · ×Ω
(AS)
EHk
× · · · , EHk ∈ Ω
(EH)
(16)
where × denotes Cartesian product. The probability of each
scenario, i.e., one element in Ω
(AS)
EH , is notated by P
(ASj)
EH ,
ASj ∈ Ω
(AS)
EH . This probability is the product of correspond-
ing probability P
(ASj)
EHk
, EHk ∈ Ω
(EH). This problem now
becomes a problem subject to multiple scenarios with certain
probabilities.
1) Model Objective: The objective function considering
AaH attacks is modified as follows:
max
∑
ASj∈Ω
(AS)
EH
(
P
(ASj)
EH · ICA|ASj
)
(17)
where ICA|ASj denotes the matching degree index subject
to the scenario ASj ∈ Ω
(AS)
EH . The formulation of this index
is similar with (8), (9), (10), (11), and (13). For an example,
variables such as XEHk , XEHCA , and XRAi , with only one
scenario, can represent multiple scenarios with the superscript
AS indicating all scenarios, i.e., X
ASj
EHk
, X
ASj
EHCA
, and X
ASj
RAi
,
ASj ∈ Ω
(AS)
EH .
2) Constraints of Event Hypotheses: Based on (14), the
constraints can be expressed as∑
EHk∈Ω(EH)
X
ASj
EHk
+X
ASj
EHCA
= 1, ASj ∈ Ω
(EH)
AS (18)
The constraints denote those variables for each scenario should
be exclusive.
3) Consistent of Decision Variables: Due to multiple sce-
narios, each variable in multiple scenarios are different. How-
ever, the decision variables in those scenarios should be
consistent.
XASlEHk = X
ASj
EHk
, ASl, ASj ∈ Ω
(EH)
AS , EHk ∈ Ω
(EH) (19)
XASlEHCA = X
ASj
EHCA
, ASl, ASj ∈ Ω
(EH)
AS
(20)
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84) Constraints of Events and Alarms: The constraints in
(3) should be expended to all scenarios.
X
ASj
EHk
·
∏
RAi∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
|ASj
X
ASj
RAi
·
∏
RAi /∈Ω
(ERA)
EHk
|ASj
(
1 − X
ASj
RAi
)
+
(
1 − X
ASj
EHk
)
= 1, EHk ∈ Ω
(EH), ASj ∈ Ω
(EH)
AS
(21)
where Ω
(ERA)
EHk
|ASj is the set of expected reported alarms of
EHk subject to the scenario ASj ∈ Ω
(EH)
AS .
C. Scenario Reduction
The proposed model can be computationally intensive as
the event hypotheses and expected incoming alarms increase.
Scenario reduction is introduced to handle the complexity of
computation.
1) Scenario Combination Reduction: Total scenario combi-
nation in (16) can guarantee accurate results; however, cal-
culations may be huge. Although missed and delayed alarms
exist in SCADA systems, the probabilities of them are very
small. Based on this common view, the expected reported
alarm scenario of each event hypothesis can be reduced. We set
up the scenarios such that at most two alarms can be missed
or delayed, and only one analyzed time window during the
communication is considered.
2) Event Hypothesis Reduction: When there are many
possible event hypotheses inferred based on received reported
alarms, we first sort the event hypotheses by the matching
degree index without considering stochastic issues. Then,
several event hypotheses with larger index values are chosen
to consider stochastic issues.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section has four examples to demonstrate the validation
feasibility of the proposed cyberattack inference system by
synthesizing all substation alarm-related events.
A. The First Scenario
The example in the Section III is employed as the first sce-
nario. RA1, RA2, RA3 and RA4 are received reported alarms.
Based on these four reported alarms, five event hypotheses,
i.e., EH1, EH2, EH3, EH4 and EH5, and one cyberattack
hypothesis are assumed. Fig. 7 (a) shows the inferential
results with probabilities of missed and delayed alarms and
probabilities of tampered alarms caused by cyberattacks. Fig.
7 (b) shows index values of several event hypotheses. One
event hypothesis with a high index value is the most possible
event that has happened.
B. The Second Scenario with Approximate Index Values
In real systems, some events might have similar index values
which increase the difficulty of identifying them when missed
alarms and delayed alarms exist. This scenario shows that the
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Fig. 7. (a) Inferential Results based on Alarms RA1–RA4 from One
Substation. (b) Index Values of Event Hypothesis based on Alarms RA1–
RA4 with Different Probabilities of Distorted, Missed, or Delayed Alarms.
B1 B2
Outage region
Closed breaker Open breaker
Tripped breaker Substation border
Fig. 8. Partial System Topology (Case 2).
proposed inference system can identify them. Fig. 8 shows the
partial changed topology in Fig. 3.
In this new scenario, the circuit break C2 is closed. Received
reported alarms include RA1, RA2, RA3, RA6, RA7, RA8,
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9RA10 and RA12. RA1 to RA8 denote the same meanings in
the first case. RA10 denotes that C2 trips and RA12 represents
that the backup PR of L2 operates. The logical relations
are shown in Fig. 9. EH1 to EH5 denotes the same event
hypotheses as in the first case. Table II shows other event
hypotheses and expected reported alarms.
EH1 EH3EH2
RA1 RA2 RA6 RA5
Possible Hypotheses Alarms (Reported) Alarms (Not Reported)
EH4 EH5
RA7
RA8 RA4 RA3
CB Alarms
PR Alarms
Event 
Hypotheses
EH6 EH7 EH8 EH9
RA10
RA9 RA11 RA12
EHCA
Fig. 9. Logical Relations of Case Two.
TABLE II
EVENT HYPOTHESES AND ALARMS
EH No. Contents
EH6 A fault on L2; Main PR of L2 acts; C2 fails to trip.
EH7
A fault on L2; Main PR of L2 fails to act;
Backup PR of L2 act, but C2 fails to trip.
EH8 A fault on L2; Main PR of L2 act; C2 trips.
EH9
A fault on L2; Main PR of L2 fails to act;
Backup PR of L2 act, C2 trips.
RA9 The main PR of L2 operates.
RA11 The main PR of L2 fails to act.
Figs. 10 (a) and (b) show the inferential results and index
values of corresponding event hypotheses in Fig. 9. According
to the results, with different probabilities of missed and
delayed alarms, there can vary from incident to incident based
on received alarms.
Figs. 11 (a) and (b) show the inferential results and index
values subject to the scenario with different received reported
alarms that are RA4, RA7, RA8, RA9 and RA10. For
example, when the probability of missed and delayed alarms
(MDA) is 0.005 and the probability of tampered alarms
caused by cyberattacks (CA) is 0.6 or much less, the event is
EH8. When the probabilities of MDA and CA are 0.03 and
0.7, the event is EH3. When the probability of CA is 0.8 or
much larger, this can infer a possible AaH attack.
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Fig. 10. (a) Inferential Results based on Alarms RA1–RA3, RA6–RA8,
RA10, RA12 from One Substation. (b) Index Values of Event Hypothesis
based on Alarms RA1–RA3, RA6–RA8, RA10, RA12 with Different
Probabilities of Distorted, Missed, or Delayed Alarms.
C. The Third Scenario with Possible Multiple incidents
For the two above scenarios, we do not consider multiple
incidents that are happened at the same time during the
analyzed time window. In the real system, multiple incidents
may occur during the analyzed time window. Fig. 12 shows the
topology. Reported alarms include RA3, RA9, RA10, RA13,
RA14 and RA15. RA13 denotes the main PR of L3 operates;
RA14 and RA14 represent that the main and backup device
for T2 operates respectively. Besides EH1, EH2, EH3, EH4
and EH5, event hypotheses EH10, EH11, EH12, EH13 and
EH14 can be possible based on the reported alarms.
For above given event hypotheses, some of them can be
happened simultaneously during one analyzed time window
and cause similar reported alarms. For example, EH1 ·EH14,
EH1 · EH10, EH1 · EH11, EH1 · EH12, EH1 · EH13, · · ·
can also work as event hypotheses. The “·” denotes two events
can occur at the same time during the analyzed time window.
Fig. 13 shows the inferential results and index values of
corresponding event hypotheses.
D. Case Study With Multiple Substations
We further extend the case study with multiple substations.
This is a realistic setup extracted from a utility configuration.
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Fig. 14. Setup of Five Realistic Substations in Breaker-and-a-Half Configurations.
TABLE III
EVENT HYPOTHESES
EH No. Content
EH10 A fault on L3; Main PR of L3 act; C3 trips.
EH11 A fault on L3; Main PR of L3 acts; C3 fails to trip.
EH12
A fault on L3; Main PR of L3 fails to act;
Backup PR of L3 act, C3 trips.
EH13
A fault on L3; Main PR of L3 fails to act;
Backup PR of L3 act, but C3 fails to trip.
EH14 A fault on B3.
The system has five substations configured in breaker-and-a-
half schemes shown in Fig. 14. Statistically, the probability
of missed/delayed alarms is approximately 0.05. This study is
divided into 3 catagories: (1) Fault occurrence (without AaH
attacks), (2) AaH attacks (without fault occurrence), and (3)
AaH attacks during fault conditions.
1) Fault Occurrence (without AaH attacks): Due to the
lengthy list of generated alarms during a fault situation, a
relevant snapshot of the list for this study is shown in Table IV.
Generated alarms include the statuses of breakers, protective
relays, and other analog measurements such as power flow
information between lines and breakers. The setup of two
independent fault events are included where one is at fault on
the bus BUS-S1-2 where the backup protective relay reacted to
the disturbance. The other fault occurs on Line 6 as well as the
responses from associated backup protective relay. Fig. 15(a)
shows the index values regarding fault event hypotheses, and
Fig. 15(b) shows the index values corresponding to AaH attack
scenarios with a variation of the probabilities for distorted
alarms. It can be observed from Fig. 15(a) that the largest
index value of the fault event hypotheses is 3.01, which is
mapped to the same value in Fig. 15(b) when the probability of
distorted alarms caused by cyberattacks is larger than 0.98. In
operational reality, it is unlikely that a probability of distorted
alarms larger than 0.98 will be concluded to be an AaH
attack. This infers the likelihood of fault occurrence even with
a largest index value. This is a study without AaH attack
consideration but the next two cases will involve such attacks.
2) AaH Attacks (Without Fault Occurrence): Contrary to
the last case setup, this case is revised consistently to the
reported alarm events with major modifications of telemetered
measurements from substations. Similarly, Fig. 16(a) shows
the index values regarding fault event hypotheses, and Fig.
16(b) corresponds to the index values of AaH attacks with a
variation of the probabilities for distorted alarms. Using the
proposed method, the largest index value of the fault event
hypotheses is 1.02, which was reached when the probability
of distorted alarms caused by the attack was larger than 0.67.
Considering small index values of the fault event hypotheses
and rapidly increasing trend of index values of AaH attacks,
it can be inferred that the substation S3 is under attack.
3) AaH Attacks During Fault Conditions: This case is set
up to assess concurrent event occurrences, both intentionally
and unintentionally. Fig. 17(a) shows the index values regard-
ing fault event hypotheses with another different group of
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Fig. 15. Simulation Results of Fault Occurrence (Without AaH Attacks).
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Fig. 11. (a) Inferential Results based on Alarms RA4, RA7-RA10 from
One Substation. (b) Index Values of Event Hypothesis based on Alarms RA4,
RA7-RA10 with Different Probabilities of Distorted, Missed, or Delayed
Alarms.
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Fig. 12. Partial System Topology (Case Three).
revised alarms. Fig. 17(b) shows the index values of different
AaH attacks with a variation of the probabilities for distorted
alarms. The disturbance event with the largest index value
shown in Fig. 17(a) has a fault on Line 6. As depicted in
Fig. 17(b), the curve A corresponds to the AaH attack on the
substation S3 with fault on Line 6. With the consideration of
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Fig. 13. (a) Inferential Results based on Alarms RA3, RA9, RA10, RA13–
RA15 from One Substation. (b) Index Values of Event Hypothesis based
on Alarms RA3, RA9, RA10, RA13–RA15 with Different Probabilities of
Distorted, Missed, or Delayed Alarms.
its rapidly increasing trend of index values, substation S3 can
be observed with a higher probability of an AaH attack. The
curve B corresponds to AaH attacks on the substation S3. The
probability corresponds to the intersection point of the curve
A and B is about 0.97. This implies intentional anomaly with
the possibility of distorted alarms that is larger than 0.97. In
this case, this can be concluded that the substation S3 is under
an AaH attack.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed method is developed to synthesize substation
alarm-related events for verification of AaH attacks. The
inference system provides an approach to identify cyberattacks
or other anomalous incidents. In the paper, it is assumed that
successful cyber intrusions can execute disruptive switching
actions associated with the substations, which are in the logical
relations inferred by received reported alarms. Intruders may
tamper with generated alarms and send fake alarms to confuse
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TABLE IV
SNAPSHOT OF PARTIAL ALARMS RECEIVED AT CONTROL CENTER
No. Received Alarms
1 S1-9 trips
2 Line 1 main protection fail to act
3 BUS-S1-2 differential protection device abnormal
4 BUS-S3-1 differential protection act
5 BUS-S1-2 differential protection CT abnormal
6 S1-3 trips
7 S1-9 reclosing
8 S1-3 over current protection
9 S1-6 over current protection
10 Power flow through S3-5: Q=0
11 Power flow through S3-5: P=0
12 S3-4 trips
13 S3-2 trips
14 S3-3 trips
15 Power flow through S1-6: P=0
16 Power flow through S1-3: Q=0
17 Power flow through S1-9: Q=0
18 Lin5 main protection fail to act
19 S3-3 reclosing
20 BUS-S5-2 differential protection act
21 S5-5 trips
22 Line 6 main protection communication broken
23 S5-6 trips
24 Power flow through S5-3: P=0
. . . . . . . . .
operators at a control center. For missed alarms and delayed
alarms during the communication, stochastic problems are
incorporated in the model. The entire problem is formulated as
an integer programming problem with multiple scenarios, and
scenario reduction is employed to handle increasingly larger
event hypotheses and received reported alarms. With the cases
introduced in the simulation study, the test systems show that
the proposed inference system demonstrates systematic iden-
tification of potential anomalous events in within substations.
Future work includes verifying the proposed method in an
online SCADA environment. There may require additional
information as well as to infer the probabilities of substations
under a control area to determine accurately the event occur-
rence of AaH attack, short circuit faults, or combination of
both.
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